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Following the German elections of 24th September 2017, Chancellor 
Angela Merkel is set to continue in power for a fourth term. But this 
historic achievement feels like a heavily qualified victory. 
Merkel will not be able to govern alone. An unprecedented seven parties 
have gained seats in the Bundestag. The four smaller parties – the leftist 
Die Linke, the liberal Free Democrats (FDP), the Greens and the right 
wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) – join Merkel’s conservative Christian 
Democrats Union (CDU), her Bavarian allies the Christian Social Union (CSU) 
party, and the Social Democrat Party (SPD).
Pre-election, the CDU/CSU and their coalition partner the SPD held 80% 
of the seats in the Bundestag. Before the election the executive was 
strong and the legislature was weak. The election has reversed this. While 
mathematically, a continuation of the grand coalition is possible the SPD’s 
worst ever result (20.5%) has pushed it towards opposition. 
Expect a three way ‘Jamaica’ coalition between the CDU/CSU, FDP, and Greens 
(named for the party’s colours matching those of the Caribbean nation’s 
flag). However, the task of tempting Greens, Christian Democrats, out-of-
sorts Bavarians and pro-market Free Democrats, into an alliance — let alone 
keeping them there — looks like an uphill struggle. If it works, the resulting 
Cabinet tensions will be noticeable. A minority government is another 
possibility.
This Strategic Update looks at what the start of Merkel’s fourth term will mean 
for German politics, Eurozone reform, and Brexit. 
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GErMAn PoLItICS AFtEr  
thE ELECtIon
The election mood in Germany is not going 
to disappear just yet. With another important 
state election in Lower Saxony scheduled on 
15 October, parties can be expected to keep 
up their campaigns until the result. Coalition 
negotiations can be expected to last until 
January 2018. 
Next year’s Bavarian regional election will be 
a primary consideration for the CSU, which 
was already having very strained relations 
with Merkel’s CDU. The AfD is the party that 
has benefited most from Merkel’s move to 
the centre of German politics leaving a gap 
on the right. CSU leader Horst Seehofer will 
likely move the CSU to the right with the 
Bavarian state elections in 2018 in mind. Their 
prospects for a state majority in 2018 are not 
good: the CSU had scored 49.3% in the 2013 
Bavarian state election but won just 38.5% 
there in 2017, their worst showing since 
World War II. 
Seehofer has already announced that he 
thinks that “leaving the right flank open” 
was the main reason for this poor result. 
This admission may not be enough to keep 
him in post until the 2018 vote, but there 
is no doubt that the CSU will try to pull the 
next German government to the right. And 
having the AfD in the federal parliament will 
also push Merkel in the same direction. So 
far, Seehofer has been able to delay a deeper 
discussion of his role in the party until a CSU 
convention scheduled for mid-November 
2017. His nearest rival Markus Söder has 
demanded the introduction of a hard upper-
limit on the number of refugees Germany  
 
accepts each year. The problem,  though, is 
that Merkel is against such a limit as are the 
FDP and Greens.
A coalition would deepen the Greens’ 
identity crisis. They have always been divided 
between a more fundamentalist left wing, 
and pragmatists like former vice-chancellor 
Joschka Fischer who helped to get them into 
power. But they managed to stay united for 
political expedience. But now the party is 
split over which direction to take: become 
a sort of eco-CDU, following the example 
of Winfried Kretschmann, the party’s most 
successful leader and only Green state prime 
minister (in the CDU’s heartland, Baden-
Württemberg), or maintain its left-wing 
credentials and remain a green version of the 
Social Democrats. A coalition with Merkel and 
the FDP would cement the party’s shift in the 
former direction seen, but alienate many of 
its left-leaning voters and members. The left 
wing of the Greens would probably become 
more vocal in a national Jamaica coalition.
The FDP has resurrected itself in the election 
at federal level with 10.7% under the 
guidance of its leader, Christian Lindner. 
Lindner’s call for Greece to exit the Euro 
appealed to some CDU voters and limited 
his party’s possible losses to the AfD. German 
industry, which has poured money into the 
FDP, sees it as worthy of ruling once again 
in coalition. Lindner made clear on election 
night that any Eurozone reform that entailed 
major fiscal transfers as part of a Eurozone 
budget and cost Germany money would be 
“a line in the sand”. Finance minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble’s exit to become Bundestag speaker 
could make it more likely that the finance 
ministry will go to the FDP, which has long 
had the role in its sights. 
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EurozonE rEForM AFtEr  
thE ELECtIon
When French President Emmanuel Macron 
spoke only two days after the German 
election about deeper Eurozone integration, 
he was aware that his words would be 
scrutinised. Macron called for a common 
Eurozone budget, a European finance 
minister, and a Eurozone parliament, and he 
thinks Germany and the EU should boost 
investment. 
Even before the German federal election, 
Berlin had ruled out Euro bonds – shared 
borrowing across the Eurozone. The CDU/
CSU remain sceptical of France’s plans. The 
party places a premium on adherence to 
the Eurozone’s fiscal rules and opposes 
proposals that could usher in debt 
mutualisation, with a coalition pushing it 
to double down on calls for fiscal discipline. 
FDP leader Lindner has warned that there 
should be no “friendly gifts” to Macron 
that threaten European stability, and 
maintains a tough position on Greece. The 
Greens, however, have embraced Macron’s 
proposals, they want an end to austerity 
and a European ‘investment offensive’. 
Merkel knows that Germany and France 
need to work together closely to provide 
the leadership Europe needs. Her coalition 
partners will determine whether she has 
enough leeway to compromise with the 
French. A Jamaica coalition would make 
Eurozone reform less likely. 
Macron acknowledged these concerns in 
his speech, saying Eurozone reform was 
“not about mutualising our past debts 
or solving the financial problems of one 
country”. In a defiant response to the FDP’s 
“red lines” warning during the same week, 
Macron said: “I don’t have red lines, I only 
have horizons.” But Macron has nevertheless 
showed caution in the face of the new 
political reality. The proposals will move 
forward in December 2017 with a European 
Commission paper and summit.  
BrExIt AFtEr thE ELECtIon
The time taken to complete German 
coalition negotiations will only increase 
the uncertainty around Brexit negotiations. 
Many in London are hoping that the 
negatives of further delay will be offset 
by the presence of the FDP in a new 
government.  
FDP leader Christian Lindner has warned 
against punishing the UK. Germany has 
“an interest in a strong and economically 
prosperous Great Britain,” he said in June 
2017, adding that a weakened UK would 
also leave Europe worse off. Michael 
Theurer, currently an MEP but poised to 
move into the German parliament as the 
FDP’s economics chief, even proposed the 
creation of a special ‘Brexit Cabinet’ to better 
safeguard German economic interests 
with Britain during the Brexit negotiations. 
Describing his own party as “very British-
minded” and “in favour of free trade and 
market economics”, Theurer stressed the 
need for a strong Britain as a partner for 
both the EU and NATO.
Having the FDP in the German government 
would also mean a stronger voice in the 
Brexit negotiations for German industry, the 
sector that has most to lose from a punitive 
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Brexit deal. While the FDP would have to compromise as junior partner in such a coalition, its 
Brexit-proposals could find favour with the CDU’s own business-friendly wing (and particularly 
the Bavarian CSU).
However, The UK often overestimates its ability to win support from Germany. In recent years, 
there have been a number of occasions where the UK believed it had German support, but 
it turned out not to be the case. For example, the UK thought it had the support of Germany 
in the negotiations on the Fiscal Pact as well as the appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as 
Commission President. On both occasions, Germany decided to change its position and leave 
the UK isolated. Also during the pre-referendum negotiations, Germany was not willing to 
give the UK government concessions on labour mobility as Cameron sought a ‘new EU deal’ to 
present to the public. May remains an optimist on Brexit, is she making the same mistake that 
sank David Cameron, of thinking all this can ultimately be sorted between politicians?
German elites and the public are on the same page when it comes to the future relationship 
between the EU and the UK: that the EU should try to maintain a good relationship with the 
UK but it should not make any compromises on its core principles. There might be a warmer 
approach to the UK from the FDP but it is unlikely that they will want to spend their bargaining 
chips in coalition negotiations on Brexit. It was telling that Brexit was not discussed in the 
election debate between Merkel and her main opponent, the SPD’s Martin Schulz.
At the end of the day, the result will not change that much. Merkel understands that the 
success of the UK and the EU are interlinked, both politically and economically, but that her 
political interest in keeping the EU-27 together outweighs any interest the German car industry 
or any other industry has in the British market. Her pragmatism will prevail.  
 
ConCLuSIon:  GErMAny, BrExIt, & EurozonE rEForM
Despite the fact that the UK does not use the Euro, Brexit will have important implications for 
the European Monetary Union’s future. The UK’s significant financial sector and the loss of its 
budgetary contributions will lead to numerous EU reforms in the wake of its exit. Germany will 
lead the EU in taking advantage of this, attempting to use post-Brexit reforms as an opportunity 
to strengthen the Eurozone and make it more robust against future crises.
A UK exit would mean the weight of the ‘market-friendly/liberal’ bloc (whose current core 
members include the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Estonia) will decline. So 
although a British withdrawal from the EU would not turn Germany into a hegemon, it could 
increase the perception of German dominance and with it add pressure to form coalitions to 
counterbalance its power. Paradoxically, therefore, Germany could actually become weaker – 
that is, less able to get what it wants – in an EU without the UK, despite higher expectations 
from other EU member states.
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In this way, Merkel may find that both in Germany 
and in Europe her fourth term may lead to 
a difficult and unsure path to engage with 
international and domestic issues over the next 
few years. The coalition may not survive and 
new elections may be required before the full 
term ends, meaning discussions about a possible 
successor for leader of the CDU and for a new 
leader for Germany may surface sooner rather 
than later.   
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